Project Bond Focus – January 2021
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)

Project Bonds: Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)

Introduction

Debt capital markets are an established source of funding for infrastructure and power assets across geographies, and represent an attractive alternative to the bank market. Institutional investors, such as insurance companies, pension funds, asset managers, and specialized funds, have proven appetite for long-dated assets, yielding stable, uncorrelated returns – all common traits found in Project Bonds.

Institutional investors’ appetite has allowed Project Bonds to finance a variety of projects across industries – including power generation, transmission infrastructure, telecommunications, social infrastructure and oil & gas projects.

Through this article, we focus on LNG Project Bonds, which is now an established market with more than $39.9BN in issuances for LNG projects globally. This sector is foreseen to grow in the near future as many assets currently financed with short-term bank financings will need to be refinanced.

LNG Project Bonds

In this article, when discussing LNG Project Bonds, we refer exclusively to non-recourse debt Capital Market offerings, related to storage / regasification projects and liquefaction projects. Natural gas pipelines are not included in this discussion and are subject to different considerations.

Liquefaction plants are projects that transform natural gas and export the resulting LNG. Historically, these plants were mostly developed and located in gas-rich and exporting countries such as Qatar, Australia, and Russia. However, in the last decade, the shale gas boom in the United States drove significant new developments of LNG liquefaction plants in the country.

Close to $50.0BN have been issued in LNG Project Bonds since the inaugural issuance in 2005, representing over 9% of the total Project Bonds issued over the same period. Historical annual issuance volumes have ranged from $420MM in 2010 to $10.9BN in 2019 in 13 transactions. 91% of the LNG Project Bonds to date were issued on the back of liquefaction facilities while the remaining offerings were issued on the back of regasification facilities. With $2.8BN issued in 2020, a significant slowdown was experienced due to the COVID-19 pandemic which likely pushed some issuances to 2021.

LNG Project Bonds have been issued for assets located in 6 countries. The first LNG Project Bond was done in Qatar in 2005 for the RAS LAFFAN LNG liquefaction plant. With all of its issuances between 2005 and 2009, Qatar alone represents 11% of the aggregate global volume between 2005 and 2020, and 100% of the volume from EMEA.

Since then, the United States saw active new development of LNG liquefaction plants. As a result, most LNG Project Bonds have been executed for projects located in the North American region – accounting for 79 % of total issuance volume since 2005. Issuances in Latin America are comprised of more recent developments in Brazil, Peru and Chile occurring from 2014 to 2018. Issuances out of this region account for 6% of global volumes since 2005. Asia-Pacific shows the smallest share of issuances (4%), which relates to one project located in Australia that issued several Project Bonds.

Storage / regasification plants are projects that import, store and transform LNG into natural gas. Of note, as a result of abundant supply of natural gas, many storage / regasification plants, especially those located in the United States, have added and/or transformed into liquefaction facilities in order to export LNG.
Most of the Capital Markets transactions have been placed for assets that were still exposed to construction risk at the time of issuance for all or part of the underlying assets with some trains operating and other in construction. Indeed, 80% of LNG Project Bonds have been issued before completion, reflecting market participants’ comfort with construction risk for LNG projects. The remaining transactions were refinancing operating assets.

Over half (58%) of LNG Project Bonds were rated investment-grade at issuance by at least one rating agency. The Capital Markets have also absorbed high-yield transactions, demonstrating investors’ appetite for a large spectrum of credit ratings.

### Trends & Highlights

#### Refinancing of Bank Loans

Greenfield LNG projects generally require significant financial commitments to cover construction costs, often over $5BN, and sponsors have typically relied on commercial bank loans to secure the original financing.

This trend can also be explained by the flexibility for monthly draws, particularly valuable during construction to limit negative carry.

However, these bank loans (“mini perms”) are usually floating rate, with maturities shorter than 10 years, are intended to be refinanced overtime. The Capital Markets have provided a successful avenue for refinancing. In particular, LNG Project Bonds offer longer maturities, of more than 20 years, while providing fixed coupon. This combination allows sponsors to crystalize their equity return, and remove refinancing risk.

Given the size of the original financings, multiple refinancing transactions are usually required. With market participants comfortable with construction risk, sponsors tend to start the refinancing process before the project is fully completed. This often happens when construction spending reach meaningful volumes, visibility of completion improves, and/or if the project is partially generating cash flows as some trains come online.

Phasing out large amounts of primary bank loans through multiple Capital Markets offerings takes time. Hence it is common for bank loans and Project Bonds to co-exist on a pari-passu basis. Despite different formats and tenors, intercreditor concerns can be properly addressed. Even if Project Bonds are not part of the initial financing structure, sponsors can tailor the original intercreditor agreement and other security documents to accommodate for future Project Bond issuances.
Case Study

Between 2012 and 2013, Sabine Pass Liquefaction, LLC (Sabine Pass) raised an aggregate of approximately $11.0BN in the bank loan market. Bank loans had short tenors of 7 years and were used to finance the construction of a four LNG trains. Throughout the construction phase, Sabine Pass regularly refinanced the bank loans through the Capital Markets with multiple bond issuances, with tenors from 8-to 20-years.

Exposure to Construction Risk

Construction of LNG projects involves relatively complex technologies and multiple parties with specialized expertise. Capex needs are also significant and construction periods extend over multiple years. These characteristics could increase the risks of delays and of cost overruns before the project reaches COD.

Despite these challenges, three quarters of LNG Project Bond issuances have been successfully placed for greenfield projects. Below, we present strategies to address and mitigate the construction risk.

Case Study #1

In July 2016, FLNG Liquefaction 2, LLC (FLNG2) issued its first senior secured notes which were supported by liquidity reserves dedicated to cover contingencies and cost overruns. This helped deter investors’ concerns related to further equity contributions and financings that may have been needed to complete construction.

Despite the fact that the project was in mid-stages of construction, the senior secured notes were successfully rated investment-grade by Standard and Poor’s (S&P) and Fitch with tenors reaching 22-years.

The project was actually delayed due to Hurricane Harvey in late 2017, but the ratings remained unchanged in part thanks to the available liquidity that shielded the project.

Case Study #2

In many cases, projects have multiple trains coming online overtime and sponsors may decide to rely on cash flows from the first trains, as they come operational, to finance the construction of later trains. This implies that the construction budget is not financed from fully-committed sources of capital.

Sabine Pass, which currently has five fully-operational liquefaction trains, and a sixth train is in construction with commercial operation anticipated in the first half of 2023, has followed this strategy. At financial close of the bank financing, the construction budget relied on projected operating cash flows from the first trains, which were expected to come online, to complete construction of the last trains. While the first Project Bonds issued by the project to start refinancing the bank facility were not investment-grade, the project successfully issued $8.5BN in Project Bonds before the first train became operational. In February 2013, Sabine Pass issued $1,500MM in senior secured bonds for the purpose of partially refinancing bank loans raised in year 2012. The 8-year bullet Project Bonds were rated Ba3 / BB+ / --.

The credit ratings were upgraded as a number of trains started operations and started generated cash flows, alleviating the risk that not enough cash flows would be available to complete construction. Train 1 & 2 were operational in May 2016 and October 2016, respectively, and S&P raised its evaluation on Sabine Pass to investment-grade in September 2016, while ratings from Moody’s were upgraded to Ba2 on June 2016 and Ba1 in December 2016.

Progress in Train 3 reaching close to operation phase enabled Sabine Pass to issue a $800MM, 20.5-year fully amortizing project bond in February 2017. The completion of Train 3 in March 2017 was a significant milestone as it resulted in commercial operation of three trains, that together generate the majority of cash flow needed to fund the remaining construction and financing costs. As a result, Moody’s raised the issuer’s rating to investment-grade on in May 2017.

Case Study #3

EPC contracts with credit worthy and well-experienced counterparties are key elements in reducing construction risk.

Issuers usually opt for lump sum, turnkey EPC contracts with qualified contractors for LNG projects. This transfers most of the construction risk to the EPC contractors and provides greater visibility in meeting the expected completion date. Terms usually include liquidated damages to compensate for delays in construction, certain performance guarantees regarding minimum capacity at acceptance / delivery and ongoing performance up to several years after operations.

For example, Bechtel, a highly experienced contractor in the energy sector, was engaged in both Cheniere Energy owned LNG projects, Sabine Pass and Cheniere Corpus Christi Liquefaction.

The EPC contract with Bechtel covers most of the onsite construction of the liquefaction facility and contains strong contractual protections with liquidated damage provisions and performance guarantees regarding minimum production capacity targets and construction milestones.

Bechtel’s ability to carry out the heavy construction activities was well demonstrated by the delivery on time of Train 1 of Sabine Pass in May 2016. On the back of construction progress, Sabine Pass was able to issue $800MM of senior secured notes in February 2017 with investment-grade ratings from S&P and Fitch. In May 2020, Sabine Pass issued $2.0BN in 10-year senior secured notes that were structured as a bullet.
Case Study #4
Cameron LNG (“Cameron”) issued $3.0BN in senior secured notes rated (A3 / A / A-) on the back of the Cameron project in Louisiana in December 2019 while only one of its three natural gas liquefaction trains had started operation at the time and one of its contractors was facing financial distress. The two other liquefaction trains were expected to reach COD during the following year. The construction risk was largely mitigated by completion guarantees provided by creditworthy sponsors to cover their respective pro rata share of the senior secured notes. In addition, lump sum turnkey construction agreements had been put in place with the EPC.

Exposure to Commodity Risk
Commodity risks for LNG projects can be effectively mitigated by the terms and conditions laid out in offtake agreements. There are basically two types of offtake agreements: Tolling-agreement type and Sales and Purchase agreement type.

Tolling-agreements are generally made with offtakers that are also responsible for providing gas to the project. The project is therefore not exposed to volume or price risk relating to gas procurement. Projects such as Freeport LNG, Cameron and Cove Point LNG have tolling-agreements in place.

Sales and Purchase Agreements are generally involved where the suppliers of feedstock and offtakers differ. The terms of the offtake agreement usually contain fixed fees on a take-or-pay basis and variable fees to cover the feedstock. The portion of variable fees in relation to feedstock is usually based on a fixed margin over a price index or hub, effectively transferring price risk to the offtaker. Projects of Corpus Christi Holding and Sabine Pass have Sales and Purchase Agreements with various offtakers.

However, LNG Project Bonds for assets exposed to commodity risk have also been successfully issued and rated investment-grade.

Case Study
Australia Pacific LNG Processing (APLNG Processing) is a LNG liquefaction plant located near Queensland, Australia. APLNG Processing buys its feedstock gas from an affiliate company at a price that is linked to oil prices, and also sells its LNG capacity to offtakers at an oil linked price.

The contract structure of APLNG Processing is intended to mirror a tolling contract and partially reduce commodity risk. However, the cash flows of APLNG Processing remain negatively affected under low oil price levels. Accordingly, the project’s DSCR levels were tested under various oil price scenarios.

Oil price also affects the stability of gas reserves available to APLNG as low oil price environments negatively affect the feasibility of developing potential gas reserves by the feedstock supplier.

Despite exposure to commodity risk, APLNG issued its first $1,400MM Project Bond in 2018, with an investment-grade rating from Moody’s.

Exposure to Offtaker’s Credit Risk
As explained in the previous section, offtake agreements can effectively relocate volume and price risk from the project to the offtakers. This is mainly why the credit worthiness of these counterparties is a key differentiating factor for operating LNG plants.

Case Study #1
For example, FLNG2 and FLNG3 share very similar features in terms of operating profile and offtake agreement. Both successfully taped the Capital Markets but the credit quality of offtakers was different at the time of issuances.

FLNG2 has an offtake agreement with affiliates of BP Energy, which is backed by BP Corp North America (A2 / A+ / --), while at the time of its first issuance FLNG3 had an offtake agreement with Toshiba and SK E&S rated respectively B1 / B / -- and Baa2 / BBB / --. This translated in both different ratings and different total amount of debt supported by the projects. FLNG2’s first $1,250MM issuance in 2016 was rated BBB by S&P and Fitch, while FNG3’s first $600MM issuance in 2018 was rated BBB- by the same agencies.

It is worthwhile to see how FLNG3 has obtained its investment-grade despite the single B-rated offtaker for half of its capacity. Rating agencies effectively treated that Toshiba’s share of capacity as merchant, assuming that Toshiba would default. Cash flows were therefore assumed to be lower than under the terms of the offtake agreement, in line with merchant pricing assumptions, and the project had to demonstrate higher DSCRs over the tenor of the notes.

Case Study #2
The credit quality of the project’s offtakers are a key driver of the project rating. Cameron issued $3.0BN in senior secured notes rated (A3 / A / A-) on the back of a tolling agreements with a group of highly rated counterparties. Total, Mitsui and Mitsubishi were all rated in the Aa / A rating category at the time of issuance and the rating of the Project Bond was one notch below the ratings of the offtakers. Note that the project benefits from three 20-year take-or-pay Liquefaction and Regasification Tolling Agreements with fixed availability-based payments, creating an indirect exposure to the offtakers and limited operation risk.
Sponsorship Considerations

Given the relative complexity of LNG projects, the sponsorship and alignment of interests are important considerations for investors and rating agencies. Sponsors of LNG projects are typically large and experienced companies, capable of allocating resources to the project. It is also common to see companies partner to form a stronger sponsor group.

Market participants also take comfort in LNG projects that are deemed strategic for its sponsors, as it is more likely that it would take prompt action in case of underperformance.

Alignment of interests is also evident when the sponsors or its affiliates are involved in the project’s value chain as an offtaker or operator. Such alignment of interests can ensure that sponsors act in a timely and coordinated fashion to implement countermeasures under downside scenarios to protect the profitability and stability of the project.

Case Study #1

APLNG Processing’s parent, Australia Pacific LNG (APLNG), owns upstream gas reserves and associated infrastructure that delivers gas to APLNG Processing. Each shareholder of APLNG is deeply involved in the value chain of APLNG Processing: Origin Energy (37.5%) owns the upstream gas reserves and associated infrastructure that deliver gas to APLNG Processing, Conoco Phillips (37.5%) acts as the operator of APLNG Processing, and Sinopac (25%) is the offtaker for approximately 85% of APLNG Processing’s LNG capacity.

Case Study #2

Cameron is owned by a consortium of large, creditworthy global sponsors, including Sempra (50.2%), Total (16.6%), Mitsui (16.6%), Mitsubishi (11.62%) and Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (4.98%). Three of them, Total, Mitsui and Mitsubishi, are also offtakers of the LNG facilities thereby aligning the interests of the tolling counterparties and the sponsors during operations. In addition, the sponsors provide a completion guarantee to investors to mitigate construction risk, further aligning interests during the construction period.

Bullet and Amortizing Structures

LNG Project Bonds can be structured as bullet or fully amortizing bonds. Investors have accepted both formats.

Investment-grade LNG Project Bonds tend to have an amortization profile co-terminus with the project’s offtake agreements. These structures allow to monetize the full extent of the underlying contracts and maximize leverage. Non-investment-grade LNG Project Bonds tend to be bullets and high-yield issuers have preferred this format.

Case Study #1

FLNG2 issued its first project bond in 2016. The bond was rated investment-grade and had a 22-tenor with a fully-amortizing profile. The project has continued to issue multiple project bonds with the same long-term fully-amortizing profile. The same story goes with FLNG3, which initially issued an investment-grade, long-term fully-amortizing bond in 2018 with follow-on issuances in 2019.

Case Study #2

Sabine Pass, which was not originally investment-grade, issued bullet-type Project Bonds to start refinancing its bank facilities. With the improvement in construction risk as Trains 1-3 came operational, Sabine Pass was upgraded to investment-grade by S&P and Moody’s. Given its investment-grade profile, the issuer opted for a fully amortizing Project Bond for the first time in February 2017 with a $800MM issuance with a final tenor of 20.5 year and average life of 15.2 years.

Case Study #3

Cameron’s inaugural Project Bond was structured in three bullet tranches of $800MM in 11.5-year, $820MM in 15-year, and $900MM in 19-year as well as a $500MM 18-year amortizing tranche which were all rated (A3 / A / A-). The senior secured notes rank pari passu with other senior secured bank debt. The refinancing risk is largely mitigated by the fact that subsequently to the full repayment of the bank debt in 2030, a trapping mechanism will kick in to fund a senior debt service account: 12 months prior to a bond bullet payment cash will be trapped in an amount sufficient to fully pay the bullet payment. No distributions are allowed during this period until the bullet is fully cash collateralized.

Holdco LNG Bonds

LNG Project bonds can be issued through a holding company that has control over project companies or a project company with multiple trains. Such structure provides additional leverage to the sponsors.

As debt service of the bonds on the Holdco level are subordinated to project-level debt and are dependent on the dividends from the project company(s), the certainty of cash flows generated from the project company(s) and their indebtedness will directly affect the amount of cash flow to the Holdco.

Additionally, the security related to the assets are provided to project-level debt providers, so the Holdco financiers are also subordinated in terms of security.

Case Study

CQP made its debut to capital markets in September 2017 with a $1.5BN 8-year bullet senior note (Ba2 / BB / BB). The issuance was made soon after Sabine Pass successfully tapped the capital markets with its first investment-grade, fully amortizing bond issuance in February 2017.

Sabine Pass, with currently five LNG trains operating and the sixth train under construction, contributes most of CQP’s consolidated revenues and a significant portion of distributions to CQP. Sabine Pass is allowed to make distributions to CQP under certain conditions and coverage tests such as minimum DSCR over 1.25x. In contrast, both SPLNG and CTPL are unlevered entities with no restrictions on distribution.

Due to the structural subordination, there is a two notches difference between the ratings of CQP and Sabine Pass Project Bonds.

Transactions in Emerging Markets

LNG Project Bonds have been issued for projects in South American countries such as Chile, Brazil and Peru.

Case Study #1

In July 2014, Chile GNL Quintero, the only regasification terminal in central Chile, located 160 km northwest of Santiago, issued $1.1BN 15-year, fully amortizing senior unsecured bonds for the purpose of refinancing the primary bank debt put in place in 2008.

The project is supported by 20-year tolling agreements with Endesa, ENAP and Metrogas, all of which are shareholders of the project with strong alignment of interests. The shareholders are Metrogas (20%), Endesa Chile (20%), ENAP (20%) and Sociedad Terminal de Valparaiso SA (which is held by Enagas (51%, Baa2) and Oman Oil company (49%)).

The bonds were rated BBB+ by Fitch, and Baa2 and BBB by Moody’s and S&P respectively.

Case Study #2

In April 2018, Developer Centrais Elétricas de Sergipe (CELSE) closed the equivalent of $1.3BN project financing for the development of 1) a LNG terminal with a 170,000m² floating storage regasification unit (FSRU) including a 6.5km pipeline, 2) 1.516MW CCGT power plant and 3) 33km electricity transmission line, located in Brazil.

The equivalent of $941MM (BRL 3.37BN) was financed through a 14-year tenor, Project Bond in the Brazilian local currency. The ECA (Export Credit Agency) coverage provided by Swiss Export Risk Insurance supported the successful issuance. The remaining $280MM was provided by loans from IFC (International Finance Corporation) and IDB (Inter-American Development Bank) in a mix of local currency and dollar.

The Project is the first private LNG regasification plant in Brazil, and its successful bond issuance is an example that there is robust appetite for LNG Project Bonds in emerging markets, when the local currency exposure is effectively managed.

Case Study #3

In March 2018, Peru LNG (PLNG), which is Peru’s only LNG facility and the first in South America, issued a $940MM Project Bond to repay the original project finance bank debt of $1.2BN, that was placed in 2008. The ratings on the bonds were BBB- (Fitch).

The rating profile of PLNG is strengthened by PLNG’s integration into a supply chain with shareholders in both in upstream and downstream. Hunt Oil (50%) is the operator of the project, Royal Dutch Shell (20%, AA-) is the sole off-taker of the project, and SK Innovation (20%) holds stakes in oil / gas fields that provide feedstock to the project.

Despite the strong off-taker profile and alignment of interests from sponsors, the ratings of the bonds were constrained due to the commodity risk embedded in the off-take contract.

Rating Agencies

Rating Agencies’ approach to LNG has historically been based on application of their generic Project Finance methodologies and sometimes their Oil & Gas methodologies.

Construction Risk Assessment

LNG liquefaction and regasification plants usually involve heavy engineering / industrial construction tasks that are held for a period of up to 5-years. Hence when assessing construction risk, rating agencies pay attention to the EPC contractor’s track record, reputation, and expertise, along with contractual mitigating factors for cost overruns and delays.

Issuers for greenfield LNG projects can expect ratings agencies to scrutinize the strength of the provisions and structure of EPC agreements. Lump-sum, fixed price, turn-key contracts with well-defined liquidated damages for delays and incentives to complete the project in time and within budget are generally viewed positively, and consistent with investment-grade ratings.

Sources of funding is also a key assessment factor. Committed sources of capital include bank loan financing, Project Bond and equity commitment from highly-rated sponsors or backed by letters of credit. Besides these typical sources of funding, projects that involve multiple trains / assets may elect to rely on expected cash flows generated from the first trains / assets to come online to cover capex of the project. However, fully-committed sources of capital are typically required for investment-grade ratings. Relying on future cash flows from trains still under construction would likely constraint the rating.

Procuring reserves or working capital facilities that are earmarked for costs overruns will be seen as credit positive.
In general, to achieve investment-grade, the project would need to demonstrate resilience assuming a 6- to 12-month delay scenario and cost overruns from 10% to 20% of original budget. Rating agencies will evaluate the impact on the construction schedule, potential liquidated damages under the offtake agreements and ability of the project to sustain higher capex.

**Operations Risk Assessment**

In assessing operations risk, a key consideration for rating agencies is the credit quality of the offtaker. For projects with long-term offtake agreements, price and volume risk, fuel risk, and the cost of power used for operation are allocated to the offtakers in most cases. Offtake agreements with financially sound offtakers with conditions of payment that are fixed fees regardless of offtake and additional revenues for contracted volumes based on a fixed margin over the fuel price is regarded credit positive. When there are multiple offtakers, rating agencies typically consider the weighted average credit profile of the offtakers.

The rating of the offtaker group usually caps the rating of the offering. The level of dependence on the offtaker is related to the difficulty the project would encounter in finding a replacement contract on substantially similar terms. Projects with limited contracted revenues, high merchant-like revenues or significant exposure to a non-investment-grade offtaker would be regarded of higher risk and call for higher DSCR during the operation phase.

Another important factor considered for operation phase assessment is fuel supply. As for LNG liquefaction projects, facilities’ connection to highly reliable and diverse natural gas resources with low risk is considered credit positive. This analysis is less relevant if the offtaker is responsible for providing gas under a tolling-type agreement.

Technological stability and operational performance are crucial. Significant underperformance for an extended period of time can trigger the offtaker’s right of termination. Credit agencies expect to see commercially proven technologies and design adopted for plants in order to consider operation risk as low. That being said, most LNG plants rated by agencies were using proven technologies and agencies perceived the overall operation risk of LNG projects as “mid-range” compared to other Oil & Gas assets.

Long-term operation and maintenance agreements are also typical and greatly mitigate operation risk. Credit agencies focus on potential replacement of the O&M provider if its credit profile is not investment-grade. This may translate in higher opex assumptions.

The location of the asset can also impact credit ratings. Weather conditions such as the risk of hurricane would increase the probability of the plant being shut down or damaged for instance, which may require additional reserves to achieve investment-grade.

**Structural Considerations**

For investment-grade transactions, fully amortizing structures or bullets deemed to be refinanced over the term of the offtaker contracts are usually required.

Provided that a comprehensive long-term operation and maintenance contract is in place, O&M and major maintenance reserves are not required for investment-grade ratings. Credit agencies will rely on the opinion of the independent technical advisor to make a final determination.

Investment-grade ratings require at least 6-month debt service reserve account as well as distribution tests to provide liquidity to noteholders in downside scenarios.

**Conclusion**

Capital Markets have played an important role in supporting LNG project developments by providing the liquidity to refinance relatively short term bank loan financings. This enables commercial banks to continue financing new projects or expansions of existing assets. This continued global refinancing effort should remain the main driver behind Project Bond volumes.
### Rating Criteria for Investment-Grade LNG Projects with Minimal Exposure to Commodity Risk

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fitch</th>
<th>Standard &amp; Poor’s</th>
<th>Moody’s</th>
<th>DBRS</th>
<th>Kroll</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Applicable Methodologies and Select Research</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• &quot;Rating Criteria for Infrastructure and Project Finance&quot; (Mar 2020)</td>
<td>• &quot;Project Finance Framework Methodology&quot; (Sep 2014)</td>
<td>• &quot;Generic Project Finance Methodology&quot; (Nov 2019)</td>
<td>• &quot;Rating Project Finance&quot; (Sep 2020)</td>
<td>• &quot;Global Project Finance Rating Methodology&quot; (Jan 2021)</td>
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<td><strong>DSCR Indication for Investment Grade Rating</strong></td>
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<td>• Min DSCR ≥ 1.40x on contracted cash flows</td>
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<td><strong>Construction Phase Considerations</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Fully wrapped EPC contract</td>
<td>• Fully wrapped EPC contract</td>
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<td>• Min DSCR ≥ 1.3x for contracted cash flows</td>
<td>• Min DSCR ≥ 1.20x for contracted cash flows</td>
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<td>• Fully committed financing sources</td>
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<td>• Construction budget includes [10-20]% reserves for contingencies and delays</td>
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<td>• Construction costs funded in a timely manner</td>
<td>• Construction costs funded in a timely manner</td>
<td>• Construction and financing costs are funded in a timely manner</td>
<td>• No specific adjustments / assumptions specified for Base Case scenario</td>
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<td>• Sales Volume: Considers forecast gas prices and excludes merchant sales volume</td>
<td>• Capacity assumed at [95-98]% or lower</td>
<td>• Lower price assumption of [10-20]% for oil &amp; gas</td>
<td>• Adjustments may be applied on a case by case basis</td>
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<tr>
<td>• O&amp;M Expenses: Independent engineer / sponsor forecast applied when considered reasonable</td>
<td>• Gas price: Application of S&amp;P’s price deck on gas prices, usually lower than Sponsor forecast</td>
<td>• CFO / Adjusted Debt of [15-25%] for projects with mini-perm debt</td>
<td>•</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Other adjustments may be applied on a case by case basis</td>
<td>• O&amp;M costs increase of [5-10]% with higher stress for aging assets</td>
<td>• Adjustments may be applied on a case by case basis</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Rating Case Assumptions and Adjustments</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• 6-month Debt Service Reserve Account</td>
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<td>• 6 to 12-month Debt Service Reserve Account</td>
<td>• 6 to 12-month Debt Service Reserve Account</td>
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<td>• Distribution Test</td>
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Source: Rating Agencies, CA CIB
## LNG Project Bond – Global Issuances To-Date

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issuer</th>
<th>Sponsor(s)</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Project Status</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Geographic Region</th>
<th>Currency</th>
<th>Size (MM)</th>
<th>Tenor (Years)</th>
<th>WAL (Years)</th>
<th>Coupon</th>
<th>Credit Rating</th>
<th>Closing Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>Cheniere Corpus Christi Holdings, LLC</td>
<td>Cheniere Energy</td>
<td>Liquefaction</td>
<td>Greenfield</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>North America</td>
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<td>14.0</td>
<td>3.500%</td>
<td>Baa3 / BBB- / BBB-</td>
<td>Aug-20</td>
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<td>Sabine Pass Liquefaction, LLC</td>
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<td>Bullet</td>
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## LNG Project Bond – Global Issuances To-Date

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<tr>
<th>Issuer</th>
<th>Sponsor(s)</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Project Status</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Geographic Region</th>
<th>Currency</th>
<th>Size (MM)</th>
<th>Tenor (Years)</th>
<th>WAL (Years)</th>
<th>Coupon</th>
<th>Credit Rating (Moody’s / S&amp;P / Fitch)</th>
<th>Closing Date</th>
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<td>A1 / A / A+</td>
<td>Aug-05</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
PROJECT BOND TEAM CONTACTS

New York

Crédit Agricole Securities
1301 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10019

Michael Guarda
Managing Director, New York
Head of Financing and Funding Solutions Americas
michael.garda@ca-cib.com
Phone: +1 212 261 7681
Mobile: +1 347 899 5427

Leo Burrell
Managing Director, New York
Head Infrastructure Capital Markets Americas
leo.burrell@ca-cib.com
Phone: +1 212 261 7143
Mobile: +1 646 441 1485

Emeka Ngwube
Managing Director, New York
Head Project Bonds Americas
emeka.ngwube@ca-cib.com
Phone: +1 212 261 7889
Mobile: +1 646 639 9514

Thibault Webanck
Director, New York
Project Bonds Americas
thibault.webanck@ca-cib.com
Phone: +1 212 261 7885
Mobile: +1 646 942 1014

Michelle Morand
Vice President, New York
Project Bonds Americas
michelle.morand@ca-cib.com
Phone: +1 212 261 3394
Mobile: +1 646 370 9599

Diane-Charlotte Simon
Associate, New York
Project Bonds Americas
diane-charlotte.simon@ca-cib.com
Phone: +1 212 261 7472
Mobile: +1 347 514 4792
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Crédit Agricole CIB (or Credit Agricole Securities (USA) Inc.)
1301 Avenue of the Americas
Tel. (212) 261-7000
www.ca-cib.com

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